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I. INTRODUCTION

"Taxes," as Justice Holmes informed us long ago, "are what we pay for
civilized society."' It might surprise many that this price is extracted even
from individuals in bankruptcy. Although the right to discharge in bankruptcy
ensures an honest but unfortunate debtor a fresh start to begin a new economic
life, that right is tempered by the federal government's legitimate interest in
protecting the fisc by collecting taxes. The balance struck by the Bankruptcy
Code2 and Internal Revenue Code3 between the competing interests of an
individual debtor and the federal government insulates certain tax claims from
the bankruptcy discharge. Under the compromise, only specifically enumerated tax claims will survive a bankruptcy discharge in a Chapter 11 case.4
* Associate Professor, Georgia State University College of Law. Thanks to the members of
the South Carolina Bankruptcy Bar and to David Carlson, Erik Doerring, Dick McQueen, and
Basil Mattingly for their thoughtful comments on the subject of this article and to Angela
Ragsdale for her help in preparing the manuscript. I also want to thank the University of South
Carolina Law School and the members of the South Carolina Law Review for hosting the 1994
symposium.
1. Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 275 U.S. 87,
100 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
2. 11 U.S.C.A. (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
3. In this article, the Internal Revenue Code, found in Title 26 of the United States Code, is
referred to as "I.R.C." Individual sections of the I.R.C. will be preceded by "I.R.C."
4. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995) (identifying those tax claims that are
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Recognizing that nondischargeable tax liabilities are inconsistent with the
fresh start policy, Congress further attempted to alleviate some harshness
through enactment of the Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 ("BTA").5 Among
other things, the BTA creates a separate taxable entity when an individual files
for relief under either Chapter 7 or 11 of the Bankruptcy Code6 and enables
such a debtor to elect to shorten and end the taxable year, thus shifting at least
part of the current year taxes to the estate as a § 507(a)(8) priority claim. 7
Nevertheless, certain tax claims designated as nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(1) (such as claims for taxes due within three years of the bankruptcy
petition date) survive the discharge and thus significantly affect a debtor's
fresh start.
Part II of this Article outlines the concept of the bankruptcy discharge in
an individual debtor's Chapter 11 case. I devote more attention than many
might believe necessary in order to explain not only the significance of the
discharge but also its limitations, particularly in the tax context. Although the
discharge is important in bankruptcy, it is not all-encompassing; a number of
tax claims do survive the bankruptcy discharge.
Part III analyzes a fundamental concept of bankruptcy: the estate. With
particular emphasis on individual debtor Chapter 11 estates, it addresses the
issue of whether postpetition earnings and valuable tax attributes are property
of the estate.
Finally, Part IV addresses the important issues posed by I.R.C. § 1398.
Ignored by most bankruptcy scholars, § 1398 directly affects the scope of the
Chapter 11 discharge and the contours of the Chapter 11 individual debtor's
estate.
II. INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S CHAPTER 11 DISCHARGE

An individual's most important bankruptcy objective is a discharge from
debt. The discharge is at the heart of the fresh start policy promoted by the
Bankruptcy Code and the BTA. The Chapter 7 discharge is granted virtually
automatically unless an objecting party can establish that the debtor has
engaged in prohibited conduct, usually constituting some type of fraud or
bankruptcy crime. 9 The statute providing for discharge is liberally construed

nondischargeableby an individual debtor).
5. Pub. L. No. 96-589, 94 Stat. 3389 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
6. See I.R.C. § 1398 (1988). No separate entity for tax purposes is created when a
partnership or corporation files for bankruptcy relief. I.R.C. § 1399 (1988).
7. See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2) (1988).
8. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, THE ELEMENTS OF BANKRUPTCY 27-44 (1992)
(discussing the fresh start policy); DAVID G. EPSTEIN ET AL., 2 BANKRUPTCY § 7-16 (1992)
(discussing the discharge's importance to a debtor).
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988).
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in favor of an individual debtor.' ° Thus, the objecting party has the burden
of establishing a ground for the denial of a discharge. '
Under Chapter 11, § 1141(d) governs the scope and limits of discharge.
Pursuant to § 1141(d), the confirmation of a reorganization plan discharges a
debtor from any debt that arose before the confirmation of the plan. Unlike
§ 727(a), a partnership, corporation, or an individual may receive a § 1141(d)
discharge. 2 The § 1141(d) discharge is broader than the § 727(a) discharge
in that the latter section discharges any debts that arose 3 before the orderfor

10. See, e.g., First Beverly Bank v. Adeeb (In re Adeeb), 787 F.2d 1339, 1342 (9th Cir.
1986); Soft Sheen Prods., Inc. v. Johnson (In re Johnson), 98 B.R. 359, 364 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1988) (mem.); Bologna v. Cutignola (In re Cutignola), 87 B.R. 702, 706 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1988) (mem.); Ashton v. Burke (In re Burke), 83 B.R. 716,720 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988) (mer.);
Peoples State Bank v. Drenckhahn (In re Drenckhahn), 77 B.R. 697, 701 (Bankr. D. Minn.
1987) (mem.); Morrison v. Howard (In re Howard), 55 B.R. 580, 583 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1985)
(mem.).
11. If a debtor has been denied a discharge, so that all debts remain outstanding, the debtor
may not include the same obligations in a subsequent case to obtain a discharge. The denial of
the discharge is res judicata as to the obligations existing at that time which become forever
nondischargeable. Although understood as part of the warp and woof of bankruptcy law, the
right to discharge was not part of the early bankruptcy acts in the United States. The Supreme
Court noted that the discharge and fresh-start policies are comparatively new in bankruptcy in
United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973). There is no constitutional right to a
discharge; discharge is a statutory privilege provided to the honest but unfortunate debtor who
has not abused the bankruptcy process. See Lanker v. Wheeler (In re Wheeler), 101 B.R. 39,
47 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989) (mem.). A bankruptcy discharge voids any judgment to the extent
that it determines the debtor's personal liability for a prepetition debt. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(1)
(1988). The discharge also enjoins the commencement or continuation of any action; the
employment of process; and any act, including telephone calls, letters, and personal contacts to
collect, recover, or offset any discharged debt. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (1988). In effect, the
discharge is a total prohibition on debt collection efforts against a debtor. However, it does not
discharge those liable on the debt with the debtor, including guarantors, co-makers, or partners.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(e) (1988). Furthermore, under § 524 any attempt to reaffirm a
discharged debt is void unless the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code are specifically followed.
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 524(c) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). To ensure the effectiveness of the
discharge, § 525(a) prohibits a governmental unit from (1) denying, suspending, or refusing to
renew a license or permit or (2) denying employment solely because the person involved was
discharged, was insolventbefore the bankruptcy case, or has not paid a dischargeable debt. See
11 U.S.C.A. § 525(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). Additionally, under § 525(b) no private
employer may terminate the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against,
(1) an individual who is or has been a debtor under the Code or (2) an individual associated with
a debtor under the Code, solely because the debtor is or has been a debtor under the Code, was
insolvent before the commencement of a case under the Code, or has not paid a debt that is
dischargeable under the Code. 11 U.S.C.A. § 525(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); see also
EPSTEIN ET AL., ET. AL., supra note 8, § 7-40.
12. In Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991), the Supreme Court held that an individual
may properly seek relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
13. The issue of when a debt ariseshas itself become a bone of contention. EPSTEIN ET AL.,
supra note 8, § 7-16.
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relief,4 while the former section discharges any debts that arose before the

confinnation of the plan. 5
There are limits, however, to the § 1141(d) discharge. First, debts
excepted from discharge under § 523 are not discharged under § 1141(d) when
the debtor is an individual. These types of nondischargeable debts include
several tax claims. 6 Second, if the plan provides for the liquidation of all
or substantially all of the property of the estate, the debtor does not continue17
in business, and the debtor would be denied a discharge under § 727(a),
then confirmation of the plan does not discharge the debtor.' 8 These
limitations are necessary so that an individual debtor may not employ a
Chapter 11 liquidating plan to evade the exceptions or objections to discharge
embodied in §§ 523(a) and 727(a).
Section 523 of the Bankruptcy Code specifies which debts of an individual
debtor are not discharged in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy case under § 1141(d).20
These debts include certain tax claims, which may be divided into three
categories for convenience of analysis.
The first category of nondischargeable tax claims is set forth in § 523(a)(1).21 Under this section, a tax specified in § 507(a)(2) as an involuntary gap

14. The order for relief is entered automatically when a debtor files a voluntary petition in
bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). In an involuntary case, the order for relief comes
after the court is persuaded that the grounds for involuntary relief are met. See 11 U.S.C. §
303(h) (1988).
15. For the requirements for Chapter 11 plan confirmation, see 11 U.S.C.A. § 1129 (Vest
1993 & Supp. 1995).
16. See 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 523(a)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995);seealso 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)
(West 1993 & Supp. 1995); 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(7) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
17. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (1988). Under § 727(a), the bankruptcy court must grant an
individual debtor a discharge of prepetition debts unless one of ten conditions is met. Section
727(a)(1) only applies to individuals, a partnership, or a corporation although legitimate debtors
under Chapter 7 may not receive a discharge under Chapter 7. Additionally, § 727(a) applies
only in liquidation cases under Chapter 7. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(b) (1988). Not all individual
debtors are entitled to a discharge under § 727(a). The right to discharge is a right reserved for
the honest but unfortunate debtor. Over-extension, unforeseen contingencies, the inability to pay
debt, and lack of business acumen are not reasons to deny a debtor's discharge. However, fraud,
criminal activity, and misconduct are. If a creditor or the trustee is successful in attacking the
debtor's discharge under § 727(a), then all claims survive the bankruptcy case and may be
enforced.
18. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1141(d)(3) (1988).
19. Chapter 11 recognizes liquidation as an acceptableform of reorganization. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1129(a)(11) (1988).
20. However, these taxes may be discharged in a Chapter 13 under § 1328(a), i.e., the
Chapter 13 "super-discharge." See 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(a) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
21. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1) reads:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, (sic] 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt(1) for a tax or a customs duty-
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claimn" or in § 507(a)(8)P as a priority claim is nondischargeable whether
or not a claim for such tax was allowed by the court or filed in the case. 24
These priority and nondischargeable tax claims include the following:
1. Involuntary gap tax claims under § 507(a)(2),2 5
2. Income or gross receipts taxes incurred before the petition and within
three years from the filing of the bankruptcy petition,2
3. Income or gross receipts taxes assessed within 240 days from the filing
of the bankruptcy petition,27

(A) of the kind and for the periods specified in section 507(a)(2) or 507(a)(8)
of this title, whether or not a claim for such tax was filed or allowed;
(B)
with respect to which a return, if required(i)
was not filed; or
(ii)
was filed after the date on which such return was last
due, under applicable law or under any extension, and after two years before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(C) with respect to which the debtor made a fraudulent return or willfully
attempted in any manner to evade or defeat such tax.
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (1988).
23. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
24. See In re Olsen, 123 B.R. 312, 314 (Bankr. N.D. I1. 1991) (holding that a nondischargeable tax claim survives bankruptcy regardless of whether such claim was filed or allowed in the
bankruptcy case).
25. The second priority as set forth in § 507(a)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code is "unsecured
claims allowed under § 502(f) of this title." 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (1988). Under § 502(f), an
involuntary gap claim is one which arises in the ordinary course of a debtor's business after the
filing of an involuntary petition against the debtor but before either the appointment of a trustee
or the entry of an order for relief. An involuntary gap claim is allowed "the same as if such
claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition." 11 U.S.C. § 502(f) (1988). The
involuntary gap claim is the creature of the involuntary bankruptcy case. This priority speaks
directly to the time delay made possible by segregating the order for relief from the filing of the
involuntary petition.
26. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(A)(i) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). As indicated in that
section, the due date of the return and not the date when the taxes are assessed, determines the
priority. See Smith v. United States, 114 B.R. 473, 475 (W.D. Ky. 1989) (mem.) (holding that
the debtor's income tax liability for tax years in which a tax return was due less than three years
before the bankruptcy filing was nondischargeable in the bankruptcy case, regardless whether
such return was timely filed, filed late, or not filed at all).
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(A)(ii) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). The 240-day period is
extended for the period of time an offer in compromise is considered by the IRS after submission
by the taxpayer plus 30 days after such offer is rejected. Under this rule, the date on which the
IRS assesses the tax, rather than the date of the return, determines the priority. Moreover, in
Blank v. United States (In re Blank), 137 B.R. 671, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1992), the
bankruptcy court held that the date the debtor was sent a notice of tax deficiency based upon a
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4. Income or gross receipts taxes still assessable under applicable law at
the time the bankruptcy petition is filed,28
5. Recent property taxes assessed29prepetition and last due without penalty
within one year of the filing,
30
6. Trust fund taxes incurred at any time,

7. The employer's share of employment taxes on wages earned from the
debtor and paid before the filing of a bankruptcy petition to the extent
that the return for such taxes was last due (including any extensions of
time) within three years before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or
was due after the bankruptcy petition was filed,3t
8. Excise taxes related to transactions for which a return (if required) is
last due (plus any extension) within three years before the filing of the

second assessment for the debtor's 1985 income taxes, rather than the date of the first assessment
for the debtor's 1985 taxes, controlled for purposes of determining whether the debtor's
obligation under the second assessment was entitled to priority and was nondischargeable.
28. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(A)(iii) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). This section grants
priority to income and gross receipts taxes not assessed before the filing of a bankruptcy petition
but which are still permitted to be assessed under applicable tax laws. Accordingly, a tax claim
will still receive an eighth priority under this section if the statute of limitations still allows an
assessment of the tax liability after the bankruptcy petition is filed even though such assessment
was not made within the 240-day period (plus any extension) prior to the bankruptcy filing. See
Crawford v. United States (In re Crawford), 144 B.R. 346, 348 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1992)
(mem.), (holding that the debtors' federal income tax liability was still assessable after
commencement of the bankruptcy case and was therefore entitled to priority (and thus
nondischargeable) status); In re Lemke, 145 B.R. 1005, 1007 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1991) (summary
order) (holding that the debtor's state income taxes were assessable after commencement of the
bankruptcy case with the result that the tax claims in question were entitled to priority and thus
nondischargeable status).
29. 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(B) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). Such claims are beyond the
scope of this article.
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(C) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); see also Malcuit v. Texas, 134
B.R. 185, 188 (N.D. Tex. 1991) (holding that city and state sales taxes owed by the debtors were
trust fund taxes, rather than gross receipts or excise taxes, and were nondischargeable); Peiffer
v. Alabama Dep't of Revenue (In re Peiffer), 126 B.R. 364, 369 (Hankr. N,D. Ala. 1991)
(holding that Alabama sales tax obligations, which the debtor was required to collect and remit
to the state of Alabama, qualified as "trust fund taxes" that were nondischargeable in
bankruptcy).
31. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(8)(D) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995). Older tax claims of this nature
are payable as nonpriority general claims. See Texas v. Pierce (In re Pierce), 935 F.2d 709, 714
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that employment taxes on wages earned less than three years before the
date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition are entitled to priority and are nondischargeable).
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bankruptcy petition or due after the filing of the bankruptcy peti32
tion, and

9.

33
Certain customs duties under § 507(a)(8)(F).

The second category of nondischargeable tax claims is set forth in
§ 523(a)(1)(B) and (C) and includes the following taxes:
34
1. Tax liabilities relating to a tax return which was not filed,

2. Tax liabilities reported by a tax return filed late and filed within two
years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition or filed after the
bankruptcy petition, 35 or

32. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 507(a)(8)(E) (West 1993 &Supp. 1995). The excise taxes must relate
to transactions for which a return (if required) is last due (plus any extension) within three years
before the filing of the bankruptcy petition or due after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. If
a return is due, the three year period is extended if the due date for filing the return was
extended. Id. If a return is not required, the tax claim must relate to a transaction which itself
occurred within three years prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition. Id. For purposes of
this priority, excise taxes include sales taxes, estate and gift taxes, gasoline and special fuel taxes,
wagering taxes, and truck taxes. See United States v. Unsecured Creditors' Committee (In re
C-T of Va., Inc.), 977 F.2d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 1992), aff'g 135 B.R. 501 (W.D. Va. 1991),
cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1644 (1993) (holding that a tax imposed upon an employer equal to 10%
of the assets of a qualified pension plan, when such assets reverted to the employer upon the
plan's termination constituted an excise tax rather than a punitive penalty and, therefore, the tax
claim was entitled to priority treatment in the employer's Chapter 11 case); United States v. The
Mansfield Tire &Rubber Co. (In reThe Mansfield Tire & Rubber Co.), 942 F.2d 1055, 1059-61
(6th Cir. 1991), cert. denied sub. nom Krugliak v. United States, 502 U.S. 1092 (1992) (holding
that the federal pension excise tax resulting from the debtor's failure to meet minimum funding
requirements for a pension plan was an excise tax entitled to priority rather than a nonpriority
penalty).
33. Such claims are beyond the scope of this article.
34. See United States v. Bergstrom (In re Bergstrom), 949 F.2d 341, 34243 (10th Cir. 1991)
(holding that the term "filed return" was not broad enough to include a substitute return prepared
by the IRS absent the debtor's signature thereon); Chastang v. United States (In re Chastang),
116 B.R. 833, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (holding that the debtor's liabilities for federal
income taxes for which the debtor failed to file returns were nondischargeable even though the
IRS had prepared substitutes for the returns); Crawford v. United States (In re Crawford), 115
B.R. 381, 382-83 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990) (mem.), abrogationrecognized on othergrounds, In

re Swafford, 160 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (holding a tax obligation for which the
debtor did not file a tax return nondischargeable even though the IRS filed the return on the
debtor's behalf); Pruitt v. United States ex rel. IRS (In re Pruitt), 107 B.R. 764, 766 (Bankr. D.
Wyo. 1989) (holding that substitute tax returns filed by the IRS when the debtor failed to file
such returns for several years did not preclude application of the Bankruptcy Code rendering tax
debts nondischargeable for any tax debt with respect to which a return was required and not
filed).
35. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1)(B) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
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3. Tax liabilities reported by a fraudulent return or resulting
from a
36
willful attempt in any manner to evade or defeat such

tax.

37
The third category of nondischargeable taxes is set forth in § 523(a)(7) .
This section provides that tax penalties that are punitive in nature are
nondischargeable only if the penalty is computed by reference to a related tax
liability that is also nondischargeable. Every court of appeals addressing the
issue to date has concluded that the tax is dischargeable unless the transaction
or event giving rise to the penalty occurs during a three-year period ending on
the date of the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 38 However, this is not what
§ 523(a)(7) requires.
That section purports to follow the equal dignity rule: If the underlying
tax is nondischargeable, then any penalty related to the underlying tax should
also be nondischargeable. For example, tax liabilities resulting from a willful
attempt in any manner to evade or defeat a tax are nondischargeable regardless

36. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(C); see also Hopkins v. United States (In re Hopkins), 133 B.R.
102, 105-06 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1991) (holding that the wife's signing ofjoint returns which she
knew were in error constituted the making of a fraudulent return or willfully attempting to evade
such tax and thus such tax debts were nondischargeable in the wife's bankruptcy case); Gilder
v. United States (In re Gilder), 122 B.R. 593, 595-96 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), abrogation
recognized, In re Berzon, 145 B.R. 247 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992) (mem.) (holding that where the
debtor submitted false withholding statements for the express purpose for eliminating the
withholding of federal income taxes from wages, such conduct was a "willful attempt to evade
or defeat tax" within the meaning of the exception to discharge); Fernandez v. IRS (In re
Fernandez), 112 B.R. 888, 892 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990) (mem.) (holding that the debtor's
conduct concerning tax obligations was shown to be willful and evasive and thus the tax
obligations were deemed nondischargeable).
37. This Section provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, [sic] 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of this title
does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the
benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other
than a tax penalty(A) relating to a tax of a kind not specified in paragraph (1) of this
subsection; or
(B) imposed with respect to a transaction or event that occurred before three
years before the date of the filing of the petition[.]
11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(7) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
38. See Roberts v. United States (In re Roberts), 906 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1990); Bums v.
United States ex rel. IRS (In re Bums), 887 F.2d 1541 (11th Cir. 1989); see also McKay v.
United States (In re McKay), 957 F.2d 689, 693-94 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that civil fraud
penalties imposed on unpaid taxes accruing more than three years before the filing ofthe debtor's
bankruptcy petition were dischargeable, even though the debt for unpaid taxes was nondischargeable because of fraud).
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of when the actual tax arose. 9 However, courts of appeals that have
addressed the issue would hold that only penalties related to the nondischargeable tax claim that arise within three years of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition would also be nondischargeable.' According to the courts that have
addressed the issue, penalties outside the three-year period constitute a
dischargeable claim.
HI. PROPERTY OF AN INDIVIDUAL DEBTOR'S BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
The profile of property of the bankruptcy estate is one of the most
important elements of a bankruptcy case. Under the Bankruptcy Code, what
constitutes property of the estate ultimately turns on the chapter under which
the case is filed and the category of the debtor seeking relief.
A. GeneralDefinition: § 541
The Bankruptcy Code is designed around a central definition of property
of the estate, applicable to all chapters for relief.41 Under § 541(a), property
of the estate includes all the debtor's legal or equitable interests in property at
the time of the filing of the petition,42 wherever located and by whomever
held.43 According to the legislative history, the broad scope of § 541(a)(1)
includes all kinds and forms of property, whether tangible or intangible.f4
There is, however, a temporal dimension of property of the estate: The
Bankruptcy Code identifies property of the estate in the first instance as of the
date the petition in bankruptcy is filed. 45
39. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1)(C) (Vest 1993 & Supp. 1995).
40. E.g., McKay, 957 F.2d at 693-94.
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
42. See, e.g., Hebermehl v. United States ex rel. IRS (In re Hebermehl), 132 B.R. 651, 65354 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991) (holding that wages were property of a debtor's Chapter 7 estate even
though such wages were not paid until postpetition, when the wages were for services performed
by the debtor prior to the commencement of the Chapter 7 case); In re Lange, 110 B.R. 907,
909-10 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990) (holding that the entire balance on deposit in a Chapter 7
debtor's checking account from the date the bankruptcy petition was filed constituted property of
the estate).
43. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (1988). This section overrules Lockwood v. ExchangeBank, 190
U.S. 294 (1903), and Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18 (1970) (per curiam).
44. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 367 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5963, 6323; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978), reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5868.
45. In defining property of the bankruptcy estate, the Bankruptcy Code starts with the basic
definition under § 541(a)(1) and (a)(2), but by no means does it end there. Sections 541(a)(3)
through (a)(7) contain additions to the basic definition of property of the estate. Property subject
to being exempt under § 522 is included in the definition of property of the estate until it is, in
fact, set aside as provided in § 522. Moreover, all the interest of the debtor and the debtor's
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Property of the estate is defined more broadly under the Bankruptcy Code
than under the Bankruptcy Act. 46 The definition, however, is not without
limits. The most significant limit is the temporal dimension to the definition. 4 Only the debtor's property at the commencement of the case and its
proceeds are property of the estate.48 This temporal dimension of property
of the estate poses challenging conceptual issues regarding what "assets" are
included in the estate. These difficult conceptual issues are not easily escaped
by resort to the language of § 541. 49 One commentator has asserted
persuasively that one cannot adequately resolve the difficult property of the
estate issues under the Bankruptcy Code without resort to a conceptual
framework rooted in the 1898 Act and purportedly rejected by the Code."0
That habits of analysis manifested in cases decided under
the Bankruptcy Act should resurface when courts must decide to
what extent, if any, a debtor's right to future payment becomes
property of the estate under section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code
is not surprising. Section 541, because it limits the concept of
property of the estate temporally but not conceptually, is often
insufficient standing alone to strike the balance courts instinctively
want to strike when considering whether a debtor's right to future
payment should become property of the estate, and, indeed, the
balance the courts do strike is that achieved in Segal and the cases
under the Bankruptcy Act, even though the vocabulary employed
is that of section 541.5'

spouse in community property that is under the sole, equal, or joint management of the debtor
is included in property of the estate. This is of particular importance in states like Texas, which
are community property states. Furthermore, inheritances and bequests that come to the debtor
within 180 days after the filing of the petition; an interest in property as a result of a divorce
decree or property settlement agreement with the debtor's spouse; the proceeds of a life insurance
policy or death benefit plan; and the proceeds, rents, and profits from property included in the
estate are all included in the definition of property of the estate. Finally, recoveries from a
voidable preference, fraudulent transfers, and the other types of avoidance powers, are property
of the estate.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1)-(7) (1988).
46. Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 541 (a)(1)-(a)(7) (1988) with 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1976) (repealed).
For example, under the Act exempt property did not constitute property of the estate. See
Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
47. See also George R. Pitts, Rights to Future Payment as Property of the Estate Under
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 61, 62 (1990).

48. Id.
49. Aside from future earnings discussed here, difficult issues are posed by the treatment of
employment contracts, annuities, retirement plans, commissions, and contingent remainders. See
generally Pitts, supra note 47, at 70-92.
50. See Pitts, supra note 47, at 87-88, 91-92.
51. Id.at 91.
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One recurring issue centers on the role an individual's postpetition
earnings play in defining the contours of the estate. A thorough understanding
of this complex issue requires an analysis of §§ 541(a)(1), (a)(6), and (a)(7)
and I.R.C. § 1398.52 Several courts have addressed the interplay among the
Bankruptcy Code sections in this context. Nonetheless, all the reported cases
on this issue have failed to analyze the impact of I.R.C. § 1398 on the issue
of the character of postpetition earnings, a grievous oversight. Section
541(a)(6) provides that the proceeds, products, offspring, rents, or profits of
or from property of the estate constitute property of the estate. This dragnet
provision is subject to one caveat, important in an individual debtor
case-"except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual
debtor after the commencement of a case."" Thus, future earnings that can
be linked to services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case are excluded from property of the estate.54 Given the
drafters' intent to expand the definition of the estate, courts interpret the
postpetition earnings exception narrowly.5 5 Presently, it is unclear what
§ 541(a)(6) means in the context of a sole proprietorship that seeks Chapter 11
relief as an individual debtor.56 To be sure, the resolution of this complex
issue directly involves questions of policy under the Bankruptcy Code.

52. Sections 541(a)(1), (6), and (7) state:
(a) The commencement of a case under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title creates
an estate. Such estate is comprised of all the following property, wherever located
and by whomever held:
(1) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this section, all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.
(6) Proceeds, product, offspring, rents, and or profits of or from property
of the estate, except such as are earnings from services performed by an individual
debtor after the commencement of the case.
(7) Any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement
of the case.
11 U.S.C. §§ 541(a)(1), (a)(6), (a)(7) (1988).
53. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
54. Essentially, three things fuel an individual debtor's fresh start in bankruptcy: exemptions
under § 522, the dischargeunder § 727 in a Chapter 7 case (§ 1141(d) in a Chapter 11 case), and
the exclusion of future earnings under § 541(a)(6) from what comprises property of the estate.
55. See, e.g., In re Weyland, 63 B.R. 854, 863 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986) (holding that
payments to a debtor under a noncompetition agreement were not within the exclusion); In re
Lee, 35 B.R. 663, 667 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
56. Under the Bankruptcy Code, a sole proprietorship may not seek relief as a separate entity
distinct from the individual. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (West 1993 &. Supp. 1995) (defining
"person"); 11 U.S.C. § 109 (West 1993 &. Supp. 1995) (defining persons eligible for bankruptcy
relief).
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B. Estate in a Chapter11 Individual Debtor Case
The preceding discussion addressed the issue of the profile of property of
the estate primarily in the Chapter 7 context. However, § 103, which deals
with the general applicability of various chapters, provides that § 541 applies
in all bankruptcy cases. Thus, in a Chapter 7, 11, or 13 case, the Bankruptcy
Code's basic definition of property of the estate is derived from § 541(a).
Consequently, the postpetition earnings of a debtor partnershipor corporation
in Chapter 11 are property of the estate under § 541(a)(6).
Does § 541(a)(6) apply in a Chapter 11 individual bankruptcy case?
Based on § 103, the answer must be yes. Section 541(a)(6) specifically
excludes future earnings by an individual from the definition of property of the
estate. However, the extent of the exclusion and the characterization of
postpetition earnings are not as clear as the language might suggest. In fact,
the ultimate resolution of this issue turns less on the language of § 541(a)(6)
than it does on the overall bankruptcy scheme and policies embedded therein.
One of the first cases to address the issue was In re FitzSinmmons.5 7 In
FitzSimmons the Ninth Circuit held that the earnings exception excluded from
property of the estate all earnings generated by services "personally"
performed by an individual debtor. 8 The debtor, a lawyer operating a sole
proprietorship firm, argued that all of the revenues generated postpetition by
the law firm should be excluded from the estate under § 541(a)(6). The debtor
argued that the court should not distinguish between those revenues actually
generated by him personally and those generated by associate lawyers in his
employ. In response the Chapter 11 trustee asserted that all earnings from the
practice were property of the estate and that the debtor was entitled only to his
court-approved salary. 59
The court identified three factors that led to its conclusion. First, it
distinguished between earnings generated by services personally performed by
the debtor and earnings generated from other types of assets of a sole
proprietorship. The court concluded that to the extent that the earnings of an
attorney's law practice were not attributable to his personal services but to the
invested capital, accounts receivable, good will, employment contracts with the
firm's staff, client relationships, or fee agreements, such earnings constituted
property of the estate.' It reasoned that creditors should be entitled to enjoy
the profits earned by a sole proprietorship just as they must suffer its losses. 6'
57. FitzSinmnons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984).
58. Id. at 1211.

59. Id. at 1210.
60. Id. at 1211.
61. Id. The Ninth Circuit, consequently, remanded to the bankruptcy court for a
determination of the portion of the debtor's postpetition earnings attributable to his personal
efforts. FitzSimmons, at 1212; see also 1l U .S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
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The court, however, did not answer the question of how to differentiate
between earnings from services performed by the debtor and earnings from
services personally performed by the debtor.
Second, the court read § 103 literally, fimding that § 541(a)(6), including
its carving out of certain future income of an individual debtor, applied in a
Chapter 11 case. 62 The court observed that when Congress sought to
override § 541(a)(6), it explicitly did so as in § 1306(a), which makes
postpetition income property of the estate. 63 Third, the court observed that
§ 1108 does not neutralize an individual Chapter 11 debtor's power to employ
§ 541(a)(6) to shield postpetition income from services personally performed
by the debtor from the estate in a Chapter 13 case.'
Although not a basis for the Ninth Circuit decision affirming the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), the BAP in FtzSimmons noted that if the
carving out of future income were not permitted under § 541(a)(6), individual
debtor Chapter 11 cases would raise serious questions involving the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.' In particular, the
court observed that a Chapter 11 case, unlike a Chapter 13 case, may be
commenced against the debtor involuntarily.' If so commenced, the debtor
does not have the absolute right to convert the Chapter 11 case to a case under
Chapter 7.67 Moreover, a debtor who files under Chapter 7 might be forced
into Chapter 11 by creditors under § 706(b).68 Concerned with the forced
impoundment of postpetition earnings, Congress provided in § 706(c) that a
court may not convert a case under Chapter 7 to a case under Chapter 13. "It
is not likely that it was intended that a debtor's future income would be subject
to involuntary conversion in Chapter 11 but not in Chapter 13. "69
In his dissent in the BAP opinion in FitzSimmons, BAP Judge Lasarow
argued that the carve out should be disregarded based on the fact that, as a
debtor in possession, an individual debtor has a fiduciary duty to the estate. 0
Thus, reducing the value of the estate by carving out future income under
§ 541(a)(6) is inconsistent with the notion of fiduciary relationships. 7 This

62. FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d at 1210.
63. Id. at 1210-11.
64. Id. at 1211; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 1306(a) (1988).
65. FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 20 B.R. 237, 240 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982),
aff'd, 725 F.2d 1208 (1984).
66. See id.; see also 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988).
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 1112(a)(2) (1988).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 706(b) (1988) (providing that "[oin request ofa party in interest and after
notice and a hearing, the court may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 11
of this title at any time").
69. FitzSimmons, 20 B.R. at 240.
70. Id. at 240-41 (Lasarow, J., dissenting); see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 323(a), 1108 (1988).
71. FitzSimmons, 20 B.R. at 240-41.
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argument, however, proves too much. Any exemption of property 7 2 where
the exempt asset has any equity is also inconsistent with the dissenting judge's
notion of fiduciary duty. Judge Lasarow failed to appreciate that a debtor in
possession's fiduciary duty is defined in the overall context of the Bankruptcy
Code.73
In sum, the Ninth Circuit articulated a rule of allocation that allows some
postpetition earnings to the creditors and some to the debtor.
[W]e hold that § 541(a)(6) excepts from the proceeds of the estate
only those earnings generated by services personally performed by
the individual debtor. FitzSimmons is thus entitled to monies
generated by his law practice only to the extent that they are
attributable to personal services that he himself performs. To the
extent that the law practice's earnings are attributable not to
FitzSimmons' personal services but to the business' invested
capital, accounts receivable, good will, employment contracts with
the firm 'staff, client relationships, fee agreements, or the like, the
earnings of the law practice accrue to the estate. On remand, the
Bankruptcy Court should ascertain the portion of the law practice's
earnings that were attributable to Fitzsimmons' personal efforts
and exclude that amount from the bankruptcy estate. The
practice's earnings from all other sources belong to the estate ....
The two fashionable knocks against the Ninth Circuit's approach in
FitzSimmons are: (1) that the court unjustifiably inserted the term "personal-

72. Exempt property is property of the estate until it is declared exempt. Any individual may
exempt certain property from the estate under § 522. The exemption right applies in all chapters
in which an individual may file for relief. See 11 U.S.C. § 109 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
73. The dissent also rejected the argument that the carve out was necessary to avoid Thirteenth
Amendment problems by observing that individual debtors may always give up their livelihood
and thus could not be forced to work for their creditors. This justification is uncompelling.
This line of analysis implicitly suggests that every potential debtor has entered into an
inherent anticompetitive covenant with himself. As debtors, we will not compete with ourselves.
This approach is fundamentally incorrect and does not work. Let us remove ourselves from the
rich doctor cases and consider a blue-collar worker who files under chapter 11. Does it make
sense to say that such a debtor is not entitled to her postpetition earnings except to the extent they
are "approved" by the bankruptcy court as a salary under § 503(b)? Is the estate hiring our
worker as some cases suggest happens when the debtor is a doctor? Is it true that to avoid the
Herbermnanpitfall she must quit her present employment and seek work in some other line. What
drives the resolution of these issues is emotion: Herberman (or any rich professional) should not
be permitted to walk away from his debts in the manner he contemplates. The same strong
emotion is not present with our blue collar worker.
74. FizSimmons, 725 F.2d at 1211.
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ly" into the inquiry under § 541(a)(6)' and (2) that by requiring an allocation
of assets between the estate and the creditor, the court is demanding a division
of the indivisible.7 6 The criticisms are related. Concerned with the legitimate expectations of creditors based on a broad reading of §§ 541(a)(1)
through (a)(7) and a debtor's substantial right to a fresh start, the FitzSimmons
court essentially requires an inquiry into the primary genesis of any postpetition earnings. Thus, postpetition earnings from fixed assets, prepetition
accounts receivables, invested capital, and good will are property of the
estate.' However, earnings generated by services personally performed by
a debtor as opposed to those earnings generated by services performed by
those people employed by a debtor are not property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(6). 71 In effect, the Ninth Circuit embraces a conceptual approach
to the issue, accommodating creditor and debtor interests. The use of the term
"personally" by the Ninth Circuit, possibly unfortunate, should be analyzed
in context; the court was merely emphasizing the need to look beyond the
claims of parties in interest and discern the primary source of the postpetition
earnings. To be sure, allocation rules present some of the most troubling
issues in the law. Generally, the resolution of allocation issues are factintensive and not generally susceptible to clear rules (although, over time,
clear rules do begin to emerge to guide discretion). But to dismiss FitzSimmons as requiring an impossible effort is disingenuous. To say the allocation
rules in FitzSimmons are difficult is a correct observation; to say they are
unworkable is just not true. Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code requires judges
to be seers. A reasonable allocation based on the guiding principles articulated
in FitzSimmons and cases like it is no less workable than the estimation of
future claims under § 502(c) or even the valuation of property under § 506(a).
At some level of abstraction, all of these judicial inquiries are folly, but they
are not folly without purpose. And purposeful folly can be a good thing.
Since FitzSimmons, courts have taken three positions on whether an
individual Chapter 11 debtor's postpetition earnings should be excluded from
the bankruptcy estate: (1) all the income flowing to an individual debtor in a
Chapter 11 case becomes property of the estate under § 541(a)(7) pending
confirmation of a plan, just as such property does in a corporate or partnership
79
Chapter 11 case (i.e., the carve out does not apply to postpetition earnings);
(2) all postpetition earnings by an individual Chapter 11 debtor are excluded

75. See In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432, 441 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1990).
76. "Mhe Fitzsimmons rule may well be impossible to apply in practice: what postpetition
earnings of a sole proprietorship are not attributable in some measure to the efforts of the sole
proprietorship?" Pitts, supra note 47, at 72 (footnote omitted).
77. FitzSimmons, 725 F.2d at 1211.
78. Id. at 1211.
79. See, e.g., In re Harp, 166 B.R. 740, 748-55 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1993) (mem.); In re
Herberman, 122 B.R. 273, 278-81 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
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from the estate by § 541(a)(6);' 0 and (3) the debtor's postpetition income
should be allocated under § 541(a)(6) based on how the income was generated,
with the portion linked to services performed by the debtor carved out of the
estate.8
In In re Herberman,82 Judge Clark significantly limited the ambit of
§ 541(a)(6), at least in the context of a sole proprietorship in a Chapter 11
case. He sharply narrowed the exception by reading § 541(a)(7) as a
limitation to § 541(a)(6) and not as a separate provision speaking to other but
related estate property issues.8 3 Under § 541(a)(7) "[a]ny interest in
property that the estate acquires after the commencement of the case" is
property of the estate.' Central to Judge Clark's conclusion in Herberman
that a physician's postpetition billings fell outside § 541(a)(6) was the premise
that such billings were not '"proceeds, product, offspring, rents, and or profits
of or from property of the estate."'
Consequently, under Herbernan,
although a doctor's postpetition billings might be "earnings from services
performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the case," 86
they failed to qualify for the earnings exception because they were not
earnings from "'proceeds, product, . . . of or from property of the
estate.'"'
In other words, to carve out income from the estate under
§ 541(a)(6), the income must first constitute property of the estate.
According to Judge Clark, it did not.
The role of Subsection (a)(6) is restricted to a discussion of
proceeds, etc. "of or from property of the estate." The exception
clause is contained within this provision and commences "except
such as are earnings from services performed. . . ." The word
"such" can only refer to the "proceeds, [etc.] of or from property
of the estate" referenced in the first part of the subsection.
Earnings from services which are not proceeds, etc. of or from

80. See, e.g., Larson v. Cameron (In re Larson) 147 B.R. 39 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1992) (mem.);
In re Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. 393 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (mem.); Gautier-Adams v.
EI-Amin (In re EI-Amin), 126 B.R. 855, 860 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1991) (mem.); In re Fernandez,
97 B.R. 262 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1989).
81. See, e.g., FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 725 F.2d 1208, 1211 (9th Cir.
1984); Altchek v. Altchek (In re Altchek), 124 B.R. 944, 954-56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); In
re Paolino, No. 85-00759F, 1991 WL 284107 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Jan. 11, 1991); In re Cooley,
87 B.R. 432, 439-41 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
82. 122 B.R. 273 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
83. See id. at 278-80.
84. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (1988).
85. See Herberman, 122 B.R. at 278; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
86. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
87. Heberman, 122 B.R. at 278 (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988)).
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property of the estate in the first place are not governed by the
exception clause in subsection (a)(6). s s
Furthermore, Judge Clark supported his limitation of § 541(a)(6) by
focusing on the fiduciary duty that a debtor in possession owes to the estate in
a Chapter 11 case; he also noted that there was no conflict with the Thirteenth
Amendment.8 9 These justifications for neutralizing the carving out of future
earnings were also asserted by the dissenting Bankruptcy Appellate Panel judge
in FitzSimmons. 9° In customary detail, Judge Clark observed that § 1108
imposes on an individual debtor the duties and responsibilities usually
shouldered by a bankruptcy trustee. In particular, the individual debtor, as the
debtor in possession, is a fiduciary of the estate and must act in the best
interest of the estate.9 Permitting a debtor to exclude postpetition income
from the sole proprietorship is inconsistent with the notion that the debtor acts
as a fiduciary of the estate.' In rejecting the debtor's Thirteenth Amendment
argument, Judge Clark noted that peonage, and not voluntary labor to repay
debt, is prohibited by the Amendment. 3
Herberman suggests a methodology for addressing these issues. The court
first considers the type and extent of income generated by the estate. 94 Next,
the court asks how much of the income generated by the estate should be used
to compensate the debtor for postpetition services. 95 According to Judge
Clark, § 541(a)(6) relates to the second inquiry only.96 Thus, § 541(a)(6)
shields from creditors a postpetition salary for the debtor approved by the
court under § 503(b) and nothing more.
Although not asserted by the debtor, Judge Clark addressed the argument
that Chapter 13's specific inclusion of postpetition earnings as property of the
estate implicitly excluded postpetition earnings from the Chapter 11 estate.'
His opinion becomes strained at this point. The assertion that Chapter 13 is
confined to "wage earners " gs misses the change in the Bankruptcy Code to

88. Herberman, 122 B.R. at 278.
89. See id. at 281-86.
90. See FitzSimmons v. Walsh (In re FitzSimmons), 20 B.R. 237, 240-41 (Bankr. 9th Cir.
1982) (Lasarow, J., dissenting).
91. Herberman, 122 B.R. at 279-82.
92. Id. at 280-82.
93. Id. at 283.
94. Id. at 287; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (1988).
95. Herberman, 122 B.R. at 287; see also 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6) (1988).
96. Herbermian, 122 B.R. at 288. At this point, Judge Clark suggests that a reasonable salary
for the debtor be set by the court pursuant to § 503(b)(1)(A) as an administrative expense. Id.
at 281.
97. Id. at 286-87.
98. Id. at 286.
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expand Chapter 13 relief to individuals with regular income, that is, "income
earners."99 Furthermore, a debtor as a sole proprietorship may file a Chapter
13 petition; continue to conduct the business' affairs; and, theoretically, draw
a court-approved salary from the estate under § 503(b).'"
Additionally, in its analysis of a debtor's fiduciary duties, Herberman
failed to consider the role that exemptions play in Chapter 11. Under
§ 541(a), exempt property is property of the estate until declared exempt. The
declaration of exempt property by the debtor is inconsistent with traditional
notions of fiduciary duties. Does § 1108 neutralize the right to exempt
property under § 522, much like it would to exclude earnings under § 541(a)(6) in Herberman?0 1
Finally, the analysis has two conceptual flaws. First, Herbermanfails to
discuss I.R.C. § 1398, the separate entity rules, and the legislative history to
that section, which strongly suggest a broader reading of § 541(a)(6) than
employed by Judge Clark. Second, the analysis is fundamentally inconsistent
with Chapter 1l's plan confirmation process.
Like all reported cases addressing the scope of § 541(a)(6) in the sole
proprietorship context, Herberman fails to consider the impact that I.R.C.
§ 1398 has on the issue. Section 1398 provides that a separate taxable entity
is created when an individual files for relief under chapter 7 or 11 of the
Bankruptcy Code."2 Thus, both the individual debtor and the debtor's estate
are treated as separate taxable entities for federal tax purposes."°3 Consequently, the bankruptcy estate as represented by the trustee or the debtor in
possession will realize, recognize, compute, and report its own income and
pay its own taxes separate from the debtor. This is not the case for partnership or corporate debtors or for cases commenced by individuals under chapter
12 or 13204
There are two justifications for separate entity status for the estate in
chapter 7 or 11 cases. First, drafters of the BTA concluded that it was unfair
to impose upon a debtor the tax consequences associated with the estate's

99. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(30)(West 1988 & Supp. 1993); 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(c)(West 1993
& Supp. 1995).
100. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 103, 1304 (1988). Sections 503(b) and 507(a)(1) apply in Chapter 13
cases. The debtor must meet the debt ceiling limitations in § 109(e).
101. Judge Clark cannot save the analysis here by arguing that creditors would not have access
to exempt property in any case. First, bankruptcy law includes exempt property in the estate
available for creditors and thus primes state law. Second, the debtor in Herberman was a Texas
resident able to choose either the Texas exemptions or the federal exemptions under § 522.
Although most Texas debtors choose the state exemptions because of its liberal homestead
exemption, some choose the federal exemptions.
102. I.R.C. § 1398(a).
103. Similar treatment is provided for state and local tax purposes. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 346
(West 1993 & Supp. 1995).

104. I.R.C. § 1399.
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economic activity. The drafters believed that the taxes resulting from estate
transactions should be imposed solely on the estate, thus preserving a debtor's
fresh start."0 Second, the drafters of § 1398 concluded that separate entity
treatment for estates was justified in chapter 7 and 11 cases because only in
those cases was an individual debtor entitled to postpetition income.
The rationale for generally treating the individual debtor and the bankruptcy estate as separate entities is that the individual may obtain new assets
or earn wages after transfer of the pre-bankruptcy property to the trustee
and thus derive income independent of that derived by the trustee from the
transferred assets of the individual debtor and assets of the bankruptcy
estate as in chapter 7 and exempt property may be used to make payments
to creditors, and hence the bankruptcy law does not create the same
dichotomy between after-acquired assets of the individual debtor
and assets
°6
of the bankruptcy estate as in chapter 7 or chapter 11 cases.1
Herberman is inconsistent with the purpose of § 1398. The quoted
language suggests that § 541 (a)(6) requires a clear division between that which
is of the estate and that which is of the debtor. An approach that views
§ 541(a)(6) as excluding only a salary approved by the court under § 503(b)
is no longer true to the dichotomy between estate and debtor embodied in
§ 1398. In fact, one of two tax consequences might result from a Herberman
analysis. First, the I.R.C. might follow the spirit and language of § 541(a)(6)
and I.R.C. § 1398 and assess a tax deficiency against the debtor for taxes
arising from all earnings generated by the debtor's postpetition services
notwithstanding a § 503(b) order allowing a debtor a smaller portion as salary.
In essence, the IRS might characterize the Herberman approach as an
assignment of income inconsistent with § 1398 and the I.R.C. The IRS might
have an incentive to make this argument if the estate cannot pay the tax on
postpetition earnings of the debtor or if the individual debtor is in a higher tax
bracket than the estate. Second, under Herberman, the estate must take into
income all earnings resulting from a debtor's postpetition activity and deduct
any salary to the debtor under § 503(b). Generally, chapter 11 trustees and
debtors in possession are not doing so in violation of the I.R.C.
The more basic flaw in the Herberman analysis is its failure to perceive
its inconsistency with the chapter 11 plan confirmation process. According to
Herbennan, a sole proprietor's postpetition earnings are property of the estate.
Section 541(a)(6) excludes from the estate only those earnings approved by the
court as benefitting the estate under § 503(b). Cases like Herbennan make an
emotional argument:

105. H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1980); S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d
Sess. 9-10 (1980), reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7017, 7024-25.
106. Id.
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Were the debtor a corporation wholly owned by an individual who also
served as the corporation's principal employee, we would not question a
creditor's challenging the wages which that person was drawing out of the
debtor corporation. That the enterprise which files bankruptcy happens to
be a sole proprietorship rather than a corporation should not make a
difference.1°7
A group of commentators has echoed the plea:
Creditors of a corporate or a partnership debtor share in the
earnings and losses of the debtor. Creditors of a sole proprietorship debtor share in the losses of the debtor. Creditors of a sole
proprietorship debtor should also share in the earnings of the
debtor.'08
The problem with this argument is that it fails to perceive where it must
ultimately lead in the chapter 11 process: a fundamental frustration of the
bankruptcy discharge and the fresh start policy. To their credit, the commentators quoted above recognize the concern, but they dismiss it quickly.
The bankruptcy concept of discharge and the bankruptcy policy of
fresh start are not reasons for distinguishing between corporations
and sole proprietorships on this question. Remember, the question
is whether the debtor is able to retain all postpetition earnings that
are attributable both to prepetition property of the estate and to
services performed by the individual debtor in the gap between the
filing of a Chapter 11 petition and the confirmation of a Chapter
11 plan. (Confirmation vests the property back in the debtor,
section 1141). In Chapter 11, both debtors that are corporations
and debtors that are individuals operating sole proprietorship can
receive a discharge. And, in Chapter 11, a debtor can not receive
a discharge until the plan has been confirmed. 3 9
The commentators miss the mark. Property of the estate revests in the
debtor upon confirmation of the plan. However, the stumbling block is
confirmation. If postpetition earnings of an individual debtor are property of
the estate, then an individual debtor cannot obtain confirmation of a chapter
11 plan (and concomitant revestment"' and discharge"') and retain an

107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Herberman, 122 B.R. at 282.
1 EPsTEIN ET AL., supra note 8, § 2-8, at 48.
1 id. § 2-8 at 48 n.37.
11 U.S.C. § 1141(b).
11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1).
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interest in the postpetition earnings absent creditor consent.112 Proposed
retention by a debtor of an interest in estate property after confirmation
violates the absolute priority rule embodied in § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). The
proposed plan will not be confirmed. This leaves our sole proprietor with
several unpalatable choices. She may not receive her chapter 11 discharge and
retain postpetition earnings unless she pays her creditors in full or convinces
them to accept less. She may convert the case to a case under chapter 7,
frustrating the reorganizational goals of the Bankruptcy Code. Or, of course,
she, a world-renowned surgeon, may quit the practice of medicine and head
for law school.
In one of the most exhaustive treatments of the issue, the court in In re
Molina Y Vedial" embraced a broad approach to carve outs of future income
under § 541(a)(6). The debtor, a surgeon, proposed a Chapter 11 plan funded
by a portion of postpetition earnings sufficient to pay off forty percent of the
unsecured claims.11 4 Creditors objected and filed their own competing plan.
The competing plan included virtually all of the debtor's postpetition income,
paying the creditors in full. " 5
Rejecting the analysis in Herberman, Judge Brown observed that
"Herberman narrows the earnings exception clause to the point of extinction. " " 6 Specifically, she noted that Congress included the earnings
exception clause within the main clause of § 541(a)(6) because postpetition
earnings are "inherently derived from one of the enumerated categories [of
estate property] in the main clause. 11'7
There can be no other reason for the juxtaposition of these two clauses in
the same sentence (one for inclusion, the other for exclusion) apart from
Congress' conclusion that but-for the exclusion language an individual's
service earnings would be "proceeds, product, offspring, rents and or
profits of or from property of the estate." 1 8
The court further disagreed with that portion of the Herberman analysis
constructed on the premise that "'postpetition earnings of the enterprise
logically fall neatly into Section 541(a)(7) as "interest[s] in property acquired
by the estate during the pendency of the bankruptcy."" 9 This criticism is
correct if Herberman stands for the proposition that "all earnings of every

112. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii).
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

In re Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. 393 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992) (mer.).
Id. at 395-96.
Id. at 396.
Id. at 397.
Id. at 398.
Molinda Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 398.
Id. (quoting In re Herberman, 122 B.R. 273, 279 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990)).
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Chapter 11 enterprise" are brought into the estate under § 541(a)(7), because
this approach "ignores Section 541(a)(6)
to such an extent that Section
1 20
541(a)(6) becomes wholly superfluous."
Judge Brown persuasively noted that §§ 541(a)(6) and 541(a)(7) address
overlapping but not congruous categories of estate property.
Postpetition earnings from any business enterprise, whether corporation,
partnership, or sole proprietorship, will employ the assets of the estate and
will necessarily generate proceeds, product, offspring, rents, and/or
profits. Thus, the sale of goods which the debtor had on hand as of the
commencement of the case produce "proceeds" or "profits" subject to
inclusion under Section 541(a)(6), not Section 541(a)(7). Similarly, a
service-oriented enterprise produces profits included in estate property
under Section 541(a)(6), 2rather than after acquired property of the estate
under Section 541(a)(7).1 1
Consequently, that portion of the profits represented by earnings from
services performed by an individual debtor after the commencement of the
case is not property of the estate."
However, the portion of the profits
represented by earnings from services performed by those in the employ of the
debtor after the commencement of the case is property of the estate under
§ 541(a)(6).'3
According to Judge Brown, the Bankruptcy Code "reflects various policy
considerations towards an individual debtor" that support the court's
construction of § 541(a)(6).' 24 In Molina Y Vedia she observed that in
defining property of the estate, § 541 applies to all chapters, whether the case
is commenced voluntarily or involuntarily.'" She was also concerned with
the construction of § 541(a)(6), which she believed was espoused in Herberman, that was inconsistent with the policies embodied in the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude.'26
The legislative history to Chapter 13 depicts a Congress concerned with
the Thirteenth Amendment. Under Chapter 13, § 1306 expands the profile of
the estate to include "earnings from services performed by the debtor after the
commencement of the case."' 27

120.
121.
122.
123.

Molinda Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 279.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 398.

124. Id.

125. Molinda Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 398; see also 11 U.S.C. §§ 103(a), 301-02 (1988); 11
U.S.C.A. § 303 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
126. Molinda Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 399.
127. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2) (1988); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1207(a)(2) (1988). The inclusion
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Congress manifested a clear intent that Chapter 13 and Chapter 12 would
be strictly voluntary, and no creditor can initiate an involuntary proceeding
against a debtor eligible under those chapters. Similar Congressional
concern for the Thirteenth Amendment is evidenced by the fact that
debtors under Chapter 12
and Chapter 13 have an absolute right to convert
28
or dismiss their cases.
Judge Brown asserted that Herberman missed the mark with its analysis
of the Thirteenth Amendment concern. Recall that Judge Clark in Herberman
dismissed the Thirteenth Amendment argument, concluding that the Amendment was not violated where a debtor commences a voluntary Chapter 11
case. 129
The question is not, as stated in Herberman, whether the Thirteenth
Amendment is implicated, but whether Congress in drafting Section 541
of the Code sought to avoid any potential conflict with the Thirteenth
Amendment. Congress expressed its concern with the Thirteenth
Amendment in the following passage:
As under current law, Chapter 13 is completely voluntary. This
committee firmly rejected the idea of mandatory or involuntary Chapter
XIII in the 90th Congress. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits
involuntary servitude. Though it has never been tested in the wage earner
plan context, it has been suggested that a mandatory Chapter 13 by forcing
30
an individual to work for creditors would violate this prohibition.'
The point here is not whether the inclusion of an individual's postpetition
earnings in the profile of the estate in a chapter 11 case would violate the
Thirteenth Amendment, but whether Congress recognized many of the possible
concerns embodied in the Thirteenth Amendment in crafting section 541(a)(6)
of the Code. Congress might have overblown the true significance of the
Thirteenth Amendment to this debate; nonetheless, if a motivating factor in
drafting section 541(a)(6) was the Thirteenth Amendment, even if misunderstood by Congress, Molina Y Vedia comes much closer to the mark than
3
Herberman.1'

language of §§ 1306 and 1207 is virtually identical to the exclusion language of § 541(a)(6). See
Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 399.
128. Molinda Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 399 (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 303(a), 1307, 1208 (1988)
(citations omitted)).
129. Herbermnan, 122 B.R. at 286.
130. In re Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 399 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 322, at 120 (1977); S. REP. No. 95-989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94, at 32 (1978), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6080).
131. See John D. Ayer, How to ThinkAbout Bankruptcy Ethics, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 355,398
n.75 (1986).
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In Molina Y Vedia, the court concluded that "[tihe Herberman court's
reliance on the debtor-in-possession's fiduciary obligations to the Chapter 11
estate to support its contention that such earnings are property of the estate.
Property of the estate is not determined by the debtor-in-possession's fiduciary
obligations to the estate; rather, the scope of the debtor-in-possession's
fiduciary obligation is determined by the property constituting the estate. " 12
The individual Chapter 11 debtor owes no fiduciary obligation to the creditors
for property once exempted.' 33 It follows, then, that section 1108 should not
neutralize other provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, specifically those sections
like section 541(a)(6) that further a debtor's fresh start.
Judge Brown's reasoning in Molina Y Vedia is compelling. Her
application of the legal analysis to the facts, however, is problematic. The
court quite correctly distinguished between those people in a debtor's employ
that directly generate income (such as associate surgeons in a medical
practice)' and those like clerical help who, although important, do not
directly generate income. 13 5 In Molina Y Vedia, those employed by the
debtor were his support staff; he did not employ other professionals.' 36
Moreover, the court correctly found that the accounts
receivable representing
37
prepetition services were property of the estate.
The more difficult issue is the role fixed assets of the estate, such as the
building and medical equipment and any good-will, play in producing
postpetition income. 3
The court assigned the burden of proof to the
creditors to show what value should be attributed to the fixed assets and
rejected any estate value for the good-will it deemed personal as opposed to
business good-will.13 9 The issue of how to treat good-will and fixed assets
as well as the issue regarding the assignment of the burden of proof are
analyzed in detail in the discussion of Cooley below.
A court embracing a reasonable approach to the exclusion of postpetition
earnings is Cooley. 40 In Cooley, the court addressed the issue in the context
of a surgeon who filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition and sought to exclude

132. Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 400.

133. See 11 U.S.C. § 522(c) (Supp. V 1993).
134. See In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432, 443-45 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988) (distinguishing between
primary employees who generated income and secondary employees who help in generating
income).
135. In re Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. 393, 402 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
136. Id.
137. Id. In fact, the debtor conceded the issue. Id.

138. See id.
139. Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 402.
140. In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
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all postpetition earnings derived from the sole proprietorship.14' The debtor,
the famous heart surgeon Dr. Denton Cooley, earned substantial revenues
from his medical practice, which he operated as a sole proprietorship."
Although more than half of the revenues were generated by the debtor, a
substantial amount were generated by five associate heart surgeons. 43 The
debtor proposed a plan funded by a portion of his postpetition earnings in an
amount sufficient to pay forty percent of the unsecured claims. The creditors
objected, asserting that all postpetition earnings were property of the estate and
should be included in the distributional scheme under the proposed plan.'"
The court in Cooley made many of the same points that the court in
Molina Y Vedia 45 would later make. Of interest is the straightforward
analysis Judge Mahoney used in addressing the issues. The judge observed
that upon the commencement of the case all property of the debtor passes to
the estate under section 541(a)(1) or (a)(2) or subsequently accrues to the
estate under sections 541(a)(3) - (7) of the Code. 146 Property of the estate
that generates postpetition income such as invested capital in the sole
proprietorship, accounts receivable, business good-will, and employment
contracts are themselves property of the estate under section 541(a)(6).
However, when the debtor is an individual who performs services that
generate income postpetition, the debtor may carve out that income from what
otherwise would be property of the estate under section 541(a)(6). 47
The Cooley court observed that as a practical matter, under sections
541(a)(1) and (a)(6), separate estates exist when an individual debtor files for
Chapter 11 relief: the property of the estate and the property of the debtor. 48 As a matter of law, the estate and the debtor are separate entities that
will recognize separate incomes and compute and pay taxes on their separate
incomes. "' Additionally, the fact that an individual debtor also happens to
be the debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case does not change the separate
entity treatment dictated by I.R.C. § 1398. Although forceful in its own right,

141. Id. at 434.
142. Id. at 435.
143. Id. In 1987, the practice generated $14,705,029 in total net receipts. Of that amount,
the debtor was personally responsible for generating $7,073,996. The remaining $7,631,033 was
generated by five associate surgeons who were employees of the debtor. Id. at 436.
144. See In re Cooley, 87 B.R. 432, 434-35 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1988).
145. 150 B.R. 393 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1992).
146. Cooley, 87 B.R. at 440-41.
147. Id. at 441.
148. Id. at 437; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(c) (1988) (recognizing the continuation of the
automatic stay against property of the estate until that property is no longer property of the
estate).
149. I.R.C. § 1398 (1988).
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the judge's analysis in Cooley would have been substantially strengthened by
an analysis of I.R.C. § 1398.
The court articulated several justifications for an expansive reading of
section 541(a)(6). First, the court observed that Congress chose not to create
separate debtor entities for an individual and his or her sole proprietorship.150 Thus, Congress drafted section 541(a)(6) well aware of its impact
in such contexts. Second, the court reasoned that section 541 applies to all
chapters under the Bankruptcy Code.' Third, the court focused on whether
the Code's provisions for relief would violate the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition against involuntary servitude which was a concern of Congress in
drafting the code.' 52 Thus, Chapter 13 relief, which includes postpetition
earnings within the profile of the estate,' 53 may only be commenced voluntarily by the debtor. Not so with a Chapter 11 case. Either creditors, without
the debtor's consent, or the debtor may commence a case under Chapter
11.154 Moreover, if creditors commence an involuntary Chapter 11 case
against a debtor, the debtor may not convert the case to a Chapter 7 case
without a court order.' 55
The bankruptcy court in Cooley assigned to creditors of the estate the
ultimate burden of proof to show that an individual debtor's postpetition
earnings were proceeds, products, rents, or profits derived from property
which had previously accrued to the estate.' 56 57This portion of the Cooley
holding was later embraced in Molina Y Vedia.'
Both Cooley and Molina Y Vedia go too far by requiring the creditors of
the estate to show that postpetition earnings should not be excluded. First,
section 541(a)(6) is silent as to the assignment of the burden of proof.
Guidance must come from elsewhere in the Code. Second, other exclusionary
provisions, like exemptions, require the debtor to make the election and
sustain the burden of proof. Rather, the § 541(a)(6) issues should be
addressed by requiring a debtor who seeks to exclude postpetition income from
property of the estate to show by a preponderance of the evidence the
following: (1) the debtor is an individual, (2) who performs services
postpetition, and (3) which generates income postpetition.'5 8 It is then
incumbent upon a party in interest to object to the exclusion of future
earnings, producing some evidence that the § 541(a)(6) three-part test has not

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Cooley, 87 B.R. at 439.
See id. at 440; 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1988).
Cooley, 87 B.R. at 440.
11 U.S.C. § 1306 (1988).
11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995).
11 U.S.C. § 1112(a) (1988).
Cooley, 87 B.R. at 441.
Molina Y Vedia, 150 B.R. at 402.
See Cooley, 87 B.R. at 441.
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been met. In doing so, a party in interest meets its burden of production on
the issue. It then becomes necessary for the debtor to come forward with
sufficient evidence to persuade the bankruptcy judge that the exclusion should
shelter future earnings from the estate. At all times, the risk of nonpersuasion
remains with the debtor.
An example might help to clarify the approach suggested in this article.
Assume Ryan is a lawyer, operating a law firm as a sole proprietorship. She
employs three associate lawyers who are compensated by a fixed base salary
plus bonuses based on billings. She also employs two secretaries and one
paralegal who bills his time but works under the supervision of an attorney.
She owns her own building, law library, equipment, and furniture. Assume
she files a petition under chapter 11, arguing that all assets of the sole
proprietorship are not property of the estate under § 541(a)(6). Under the
model suggested here, she must show that (1) she is an individual, (2) who
performs services postpetition, and (3) which generates earnings postpetition
to exclude postpetition earnings from the bankruptcy estate under § 541(a)(6).
We can dispense with the building, law library, equipment, and furniture:
these assets are property of the estate under § 541(a)(1) and are not postpetition earnings. Moreover, any receivables generated prepetition or reflecting
prepetition services are also property of the estate.
The more difficult issue is with postpetition income generated by the
enterprise but not necessarily by Ryan. Ryan could show that those earnings
arising because of her services are excluded under § 541(a)(6). Her creditors
would counter with evidence that the associates and paralegal generate income
apart from Ryan. Ryan must then prove that the employees do not. She will
lose as to the associates. She might prevail as to at least a portion of the
paralegal's time, that segment reflecting work conducted under her supervision. Furthermore, although secretaries are necessary and valuable people in
a law practice, they are not primarily responsible for generating receivables.
Finally, there is the question of good-will. To the extent "good-will" is
intertwined with the individual debtor as in Cooley, it should be treated like
its economic manifestation, that is, postpetition earnings. Consequently,
postpetition good-will as manifested in earnings for services performed by the
debtor postpetition is not property of the estate under § 541(a)(6).
In sum, in addition to the language in sections 541(a)(6) and 103, the
language and intent of I.R.C. § 1398 provide that postpetition earnings by an
individual do not constitute property of the estate. Of course, this limitation
applies only to the extent postpetition earnings represent compensation for
services performed by an individual debtor. If one can show that the
postpetition earnings were not derived from services performed by an
individual debtor but from services performed by primary employees of the
individual debtor in the particular enterprise who directly generate income,
then those future earnings do not comprise property of the estate. Furthermore, I.R.C. § 1398 recognizes that an individual's Chapter 11 estate is a

Published by Scholar Commons, 2020

27

South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 6 [2020], Art. 4

1230

SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[
[Vol.
46:1203

separate entity largely because of the postpetition earnings exclusion, a result
much different than that for a partnership or corporation.' 9 Likewise,
I.R.C. § 1398 does not apply when an individual debtor files for relief under
Chapters 12 or 13 because, under those chapters, postpetition income
generated by the debtor is explicitly incorporated into the estate.
Moreover, the precise requirements of chapter 11 plan confirmation as
well as the coupling of revestment and discharge to confirmation are frustrated
by cases like Herberman. The debtor cannot retain an interest in postpetition
earnings in any proposed plan without violating § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii). Thus the
persuasiveness of cases like Herberman"° is significantly undercut because
of the failure to include any analysis of § 1129(b)(2)(B)(ii) I.R.C. § 1398.
C. Tax Attributes as Property of the Estate
In bankruptcy one of the more important "assets" of a debtor is the
debtor's ability to use certain tax attributes to shelter future income from taxes
or to defer taxes. The question often presented is whether tax attributes such
6
as net operating losses and carryovers (NOLs) are property of the estate.1 1
Most courts that have addressed the issue under the Bankruptcy Code have
answered yes. 162 For example, in Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors
v. PSS Steamship Co. (In re PrudentialLines, Inc.),' 3 the Second Circuit
concluded that the right to use NOLs to obtain favorable tax treatment is
valuable to an ongoing business and to the efforts of a debtor during a
reorganization.'" Consequently, the NOLs were property of the debtor's
bankruptcy estate within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Code.
In PrudentialLines, creditors commenced an involuntary case against the
debtor corporation under § 303. After the bankruptcy court entered an order
for relief, the debtor's parent corporation attempted to take a worthless stock
deduction for its investment in the debtor." A creditors' committee argued

159. I.R.C. § 1399 (1988).
160. In re Herberman, 122 B.R. 273 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990).
161. Although NOLs are usually at the center of the dispute, other tax attributes also might
benefit the estate. See, e.g., In re Goldsberry, 142 B.R. 158, 159 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992)
(mem.) (holding that a federal earned income credit was "property of the estate"); In re
Buchanan, 139 B.R. 721, 722 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1992) (mem.) (holding that the earned income
tax credit portion of a Chapter 7 debtor's tax refund was property of the debtor's estate); In re
Davis, 136 B.R. 203, 207 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1991) (holding that an earned income tax credit
constitutes property of the estate).
162. This may not be so under the Bankruptcy Act with its more restrictive definition of estate
property. See In re Luster, 981 F.2d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 1992).
163. 928 F.2d 565 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991).
164. Id. at 572-73.
165. Id. at 572.
166. Id. at 567.
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that the parent's worthless stock deduction would effectively eliminate NOLs
in the amount of $74 million otherwise available to the debtor.1 67 The
Committee further argued that the NOLs
constituted property of the estate that
68
was protected by the automatic stay.
The bankruptcy court agreed with the committee's argument and enjoined
the parent corporation from taking the worthless stock deduction. 169 The
Second Circuit affirmed and concluded that the NOLs were property of the
debtor's estate.77 The NOLs represented a potential claim for tax refunds
and, therefore, were potentially valuable assets to the estate. 171 Consequently, NOLs, like any other estate property, are protected by the automatic stay.
Thus, the parent corporation's attempt to take the worthless stock deduction
was tantamount to exercising control over the property of the estate in
violation of § 362(a)(3) of the Code. 2
PrudentialLines also recognizes that tax attributes have value from the
perspective of creditors of the estate. Tax attributes allow the estate to shelter
income, reduce taxes, and possibly increase the return to unsecured creditors.
An expansive view of PrudentialLinessuggests that any tax attributes that
might benefit the estate are estate property. However, the IRS has vigorously
disagreed. Section 1398 of the Internal Revenue Code transfers certain
enumerated tax attributes from the individual debtor to the estate at the
commencement of the case. 73 The IRS asserts that only the tax attributes
specifically delineated in section 1398(g) constitute property of a bankruptcy
estate. 4 The IRS further argues that section 1398(g) would be redundant

167. Id. See generally Kenneth Glusman, How Far Cana Bankruptcy Court Go in Controlling
a Debtor's Tax Attributes?, 74 J. TAx'N 84 (1991).
168. PrudentialLines, 928 F.2d at 567.
169. In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 107 B.R. 832 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 928 F.2d 565
(2d Cir.), and cert. denied, 502 U.S. 821 (1991).
170. PrudentialLines, 928 F.2d at 571.
171. Id.; accord In re Phar-Mor, Inc., 152 B.R. 924 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993) (mem.)
(holding that NOLs constitute property of the estate). This position is contrary to the treatment
of NOLs under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 which did not include NOLs in estate property. See,
e.g., In re Luster, 981 F.2d 277 (7th Cir. 1992).
172. PrudentialLines,928 F.2d at 574; see also In re Phar-Mor, 152 B.R. at 926. Section
362(a) provides that "a petition filed under section 301, 302, or 303 ... operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of... any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate. . .
11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1988).
173. The I.R.C. defines the commencement of a case as the date on which the case under
Chapter 11 is commenced. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(3) (1988). Both voluntary and involuntary cases are
commenced by filing a petition in bankruptcy under the appropriate chapter. See 11 U.S.C.
§§ 301, 303.
174. Because I.R.C. § 1398 applies only to an individual debtor under Chapter 7 or 11, the
IRS would prevent NOLs from becoming property of the estate in all nonindividual debtor
bankruptcy cases.
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if Congress had intended all tax attributes to pass into the estate under section
541(a) of the Code.
The BTA includes specific tax consequences and rules which apply to an
individual debtor in a Chapter 11 bankruptcy. These rules provide that the
bankruptcy estate of an individual debtor is treated as a separate taxable entity
if the debtor files for relief under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code."75 A separate taxable entity is not created for debtors
who file under
1 76
Chapters 12 or 13 or for a debtor who is not an individual.
Section 1398 furthers the fresh start policy embodied in the Bankruptcy
Code."7 The Committee Reports recognize that the purpose of bankruptcy
is to allow a debtor to begin his or her economic life anew. 78 Consistent
with this purpose is that the income and losses of a separate taxable entity are
computed separately from the individual debtor.1 79 Any estate tax liability
is generally confined to the estate and its assets. Furthermore, by making the
short-year election, 80 a debtor might be able to shift at least part of his or
her tax liability to the estate as a section 507(a)(8) priority claim.
Under I.R.C. § 1398(g), the estate succeeds to certain enumerated tax
attributes of the debtor upon commencement of the case. Presently, these tax
attributes include net-operating loss carryovers as determined under I.R.C.
§ 172; excess charitable contribution carryovers as determined under I.R.C.
§ 170(d)(1); the recovery of tax benefit items under I.R.C. § 111; certain
credit carryovers; capital loss carryovers determined under I.R.C. § 1212; the
basis, holding period, and character of property; the debtor's method of
accounting; and other tax attributes of the debtor to the extent provided in
regulations carrying out the purposes of § 1398.181 In 1992, the Service
added passive activity and at-risk activity losses and credits to the list of tax
attributes that pass from a debtor to the estate. 12 Upon dismissal or
termination of the estate, any unused attributes are transferred back to the debtor. 18

175. I.R.C. § 1398(a)-(b) (1988). Section 1398(b)(2) states that the separate-entityrules do not
apply at the partnership level even if all the partners are individuals.
176. If an individual's bankruptcy case is later dismissed, the estate is not treated as a separate
entity. I.R.C. § 1398(b)(1) (1988). Thus, it is appropriate to treat the tax status of the former
debtor as if the case had never commenced.
177. See H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at 19 (1980); S. REP. No. 1035, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess., at 24 (1980).
178. Id.
179. See I.R.C. § 1398(c) & (e) (1988).
180. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2) (1988).

181. I.R.C. § 1398(g) (1988).
182. 26 C.F.R. §§ 1.1398-1 & -2,57 Fed. Reg. 53300 (1992) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 1) (proposed Nov. 9, 1992).
183. I.R.C. § 1398(i) (1988). The tax attributes are determined as of the first day of the
debtor's taxable year in which the bankruptcy case commences. For example, if the bankruptcy
case was commenced on September 15, 1994, the tax attributes would be determined as of
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Is I.R.C. § 1398(g) redundant and unnecessary?
Are a debtor's
prepetition tax attributes already property of the bankruptcy estate? If so,
what is the purpose of § 1398? It would appear that section 541(a)(1) through
(a)(7) already account for tax attributes as property of the estate. These tax
attributes possess real value to the estate from the perspective of the unsecured
creditors. Moreover, they may be viewed as a hold-out power from the
perspective of the debtor, a telling sign of a property right. The tax attributes
should reduce the tax claims against the estate, thus maximizing the distribution to the unsecured creditors. These tax attributes might also permit the
estate to obtain a tax refund to be distributed to all creditors in accordance
with the priority rules under the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, Prudential
Lines provides the better argument on this point.
Under my reading, however, I.R.C. § 1398(g) appears to be superfluous
if its purpose were to transfer tax attributes from the debtor to the estate;
section 541(a)(1) through (a)(7) already accomplish this task. There is,
however, a more subtle role that § 1398(g) plays in this context. The
importance of § 1398(g) is that it operates as a gate to keep certain tax
attributes from passing from an individual debtor to the bankruptcy estate.
Although § 1398(g) accomplishes this task through a negative inference, it
recognizes that in some instances allowing certain tax attributes to remain with
the debtor furthers the individual debtor's fresh start, a formidable policy
under the BTA even when the fresh start is at the expense of the creditors of
the estate.' 1 4

January 1, 1994. Just as the transferor in an I.R.C. § 381 transaction can no longer use its tax
attributes after a reorganization, the debtor cannot use his or her attributes in determining the
debtor's tax liability for periods commencing after the beginning of the bankruptcy case and
before its completion. Thus, any losses or credit carryovers of the debtor for periods prior to the
bankruptcy case cannot be used by the debtor. If, in the first year after commencement of the
bankruptcy case, the debtor has taxable income and the bankruptcy estate has a net operating loss,
then any losses or credit carryovers of the debtor for periods prior to the bankruptcy case cannot
be used by the debtor. Nor can the debtor carry back any losses or unused credits arising from
its activities after the bankruptcy case commenced to the debtor's prebankruptcy taxable years.
I.R.C. § 13980)(2)(B) (1988). The trustee must have access to the prior income tax returns of
the debtor to determine attribute carryovers and carry back losses and tax credits to prebankruptcy years of the debtor. The Internal Revenue Code provides that, upon written request, the
income tax returns of the debtor for the taxable year in which the voluntary bankruptcy case is
commenced and for preceding years are open to inspection by or disclosure to the trustee of the
bankruptcy estate. 26 U.S.C.A. § 6103(e)(5)(A) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). A debtor is given
similar access to the returns of the bankruptcy estate. In an involuntary bankruptcy case,
however, disclosure to the trustee is not permitted until such time as an order for relief has been
entered by the bankruptcy court, or unless the bankruptcy court finds that disclosure is
appropriate for purposes of determining whether an order for relief should be entered. 26
U.S.C.A. § 6103(e)(5)(C) (West 1988 & Supp. 1995).
184. My analysis of§ 1398 is similar to the justification for the future-earnings carve out under
section 541(a)(6) of the Code and the role exemptions play in the context of debtors creditors.
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IV. SEPARATE ENTITY RULES: I.R.C. § 1398
One of the most important provisions in the I.R.C. from the perspective
of individual debtors interested in a robust fresh start-a fresh start even from
certain tax debts-is I.R.C. § 1398.18 Section 1398 creates a separate entity

for purposes of federal income taxes in cases in which individual debtors file

for relief under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.8 6
Under the BTA, when an individual files a bankruptcy petition under
Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, a separate taxable entity is created. This new entity
succeeds to the assets, liabilities, and enumerated tax attributes of the
debtor.8 7 The separate entity is called the bankruptcy estate and is wholly
distinct from the individual for income tax purposes."8 8 Thus, for example,
income earned by an individual debtor after commencement of the bankruptcy
case does not become part of the bankruptcy estate.' 9 Furthermore, each
entity must file separate income tax returns for the period of the bankruptcy
case. 190
A. Mechanics of Taxing the Estate
The taxable year of the bankruptcy estate begins as of the date the
bankruptcy case is commenced. 91 Presumably, as is the case for any new
entity, the estate may select whatever taxable year end it desires." 9 If,
however, the bankruptcy case is terminated"9 before the end of the year

185. For a detailed analysis of § 1398, see generally C. RICHARD MCQUEEN & JACK F.
WILLIAMS, TAX ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE, §§ 18.01-.32 (2d ed. 1994).
186. Section 346 provides similar but not identical treatment for state and local tax purposes.
For a careful analysis of the state and local tax consequencesof bankruptcy. See id. §§ 19.01-.30.
187. I.R.C. § 1398(a) (1988).
188. See generally I.R.C. § 1398(c), (e), (f) (1988).
189. See I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) (1988).
190. I.R.C. § 1398(c)(1) (1988). No separate taxable entity is created on commencement of
a case by an individual under Chapters 12 or 13 or in the case of any other entity under Chapter
11 (e.g., corporation, partnership, or trust). I.R.C. §§ 1398(a), 1399 (1988).
191. I.R.C. § 1398(d) (1988).
192. 26 U.S.C.A. § 441 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.441-1(b)(3)
(1987).
193. One of the more frustrating problems in studying the interface between bankruptcy and
tax is the use of ambiguous terms by one code to define legal consequences in that and another
code. The word "termination" is a good example. See I.R.C. § 1398(f), (i) (1988). When does
a bankruptcy case terminate? Certainly, termination does not mean only that the case must be
closed under § 350. If so, Congress would have used the term "closed." Termination must
include not only closing a case but also dismissal of the case or even confirmation of a plan. The
meaning of this term is quite significant in the context of the tax consequences of the bankruptcy
abandonment of property. For a thorough analysis of the tax consequences of bankruptcy
abandonment, see Jack F. Williams, The Tax Consequences of Abandonment Under the

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol46/iss6/4

32

Williams: The Gederal Tax Consequences of Individual Chapter 11 Cases

1995]

FEDERAL TAx CONSEQUENCES

1235

chosen by the estate, the estate's tax year is closed as of the date of termination. 194
Once the bankruptcy case is commenced, the separate entity rules apply.
If the case is subsequently dismissed, then the separate entity rules are
inapplicable.195 In such an instance, the bankruptcy estate ceases to exist
and, in fact, is regarded as never having existed. 196 If the bankruptcy case
had extended beyond one taxable year and the bankruptcy estate had gross
income and deductions in those taxable years and the case had been subsequently dismissed, then the debtor must file amended returns to report the
gross income and deductions of the estate. " Furthermore, if the bankruptcy
estate had filed an income tax return and paid any taxes, the debtor would be
entitled to a refund of the tax paid by the estate.
Under § 1398 of the I.R.C., the bankruptcy estate is entitled to one
change in its accounting period without the consent of the IRS; 19s The stated
purpose for this rule is to allow the estate to close its tax year before the
expected termination of the estate and effect an expeditious determination of
its final tax liability in accordance with § 505.'99
Consistent with its separate entity status, an estate computes its own
taxable income in the same manner as an individual.'t The estate is taxed
at the same rate as a married individual filing separately" 1 because this is
the highest rate available for individual taxpayers.
The Chapter 7 or 11 trustee (or debtor in possession in a Chapter 11 case
when no trustee has been appointed) is required to file any returns required by
law on behalf of the estate and to pay any taxes due.m The trustee must file
a return for each taxable year that the estate's gross income exceeds the
standard deduction and the exemption amount.

Bankruptcy Code, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 13 (1994).
194. See I.R.C. § 443 (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.443-1(a)(2) (1981).
195. I.R.C. § 1398(b)(1) (1988).
196. I.R.C. § 1398(b)(1) (1988); Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-14T(b) (redesignated in
1992).
197. Proper notice must be sent to the IRS service center in which the returns for the prior
years had been filed if the bankruptcy case is dismissed or converted to a Chapter 13 case.
Announcement 81-96 (May 7, 1981), 1981-20 IRB 13.
198. I.R.C. § 13980)(1) (1988). Otherwise, like any other taxpayer, consent of the
Commissioner would be required under I.R.C. § 442.
199. S. REP. No. 1035, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., at30 (1980); H.R. REP. No. 833, 96th Cong.
2d Sess., at 25 (1980). See generally 11 U.S.C. § 505(b) (1988).

200. I.R.C. § 1398(c) (1988).
201. Id. For state and local tax purposes, the bankruptcy estate is taxed as an estate. See 11
U.S.C.A. § 346(b) (Vest 1993 & Supp. 1995).
202. I.R.C. § 1398(c), (e) (1988).
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B. Determinationof Income of the Estate
Upon commencement of a bankruptcy case and the corresponding creation
of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor is concerned with the treatment of income,
deductions, and credits of the bankruptcy estate. The items to be included in
the gross income of the bankruptcy estate consist of the following: (1) any
gross income of the individual debtor that under the substantive law of
bankruptcy constitutes property of the bankruptcy estate and (2) the gross
income of the estate beginning on and continuing after the date the case is
commenced.' 3 The gross income of the debtor, however, will not include
any income item to the extent that such an item is included in the gross income
of the bankruptcy estate.' 4 Section 1398 does not permit double counting
of income or losses by both the estate and the debtor. Thus, § 1398(e)(2) of
the I.R. C. provides that a debtor's gross income for any taxable year does not
include any item to the extent that it is included in the estate's gross income.
In addition, the transfer of the debtor's assets to the estate at the
commencement of the bankruptcy case will not give rise to recognition of gain
or loss, recapture of deductions or credits, or acceleration of any item of
income or deduction merely by reason of the debtor's transfer of estate
property by operation of law under § 541(a)(1) of the Code and § 1398 of the
I.R.C. °5 The bankruptcy estate will receive the same tax treatment as the
debtor with respect to the transferred assets. For example, a transfer of an
installment obligation will not accelerate the recognition of the deferred gain,
and the estate will report the deferred gain as installment payments are
received.
Whether the debtor or the estate reports cancellation of indebtedness
income depends on when the taxable event occurs. If a substantial modification of a debt, such as complete or partial discharge or modification of
principal amount, occurs before the commencement of the case, generally the
debtor should recognize the income under I.R.C. § 61(a) unless it can be
excluded under I.R.C. § 108(a). 0 6 However, if the taxable event occurs
after commencement of the case, then the estate should recognize the income
under § 61(a) of the I.R.C. unless it can be excluded under § 108(a).
Prior to the BTA, the law was unclear as to whether certain expenses paid
by the estate were deductible by the estate if the trustee did not actually
operate the debtor's trade or business. The BTA provides that any amount paid

203. I.R.C. § 1398(e)(1) (1988).
204. I.R.C. § 1398(e)(2) (1988).
205. I.R.C. § 1398()(1) (1988).
206. See I.R.C. § 108 (1988) (concerning treatment of cancellation of indebtedness income
when taxpayer is insolvent under Chapter 11). There is a way to shift at least some of the tax
consequences from the debtor to the estate through a § 1398(d)(2) short-year election by the
debtor.
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or incurred by the bankruptcy estate is deductible or creditable by the estate
to the same extent as that item would have been deductible or creditable by the
debtor had the debtor continued in the same trade, businesses, or activity as
before the commencement of the bankruptcy case and had the debtor paid or
incurred the amount.2 ' Similar rules also apply in determining whether
amounts paid by the estate are to be considered as wages for federal
employment tax purposes. 208
NOLs, other than administration and court expenses discussed below, and
excess unused credits presumably can be carried back and over for the same
periods allowed the debtor.209 If the NOLs correspond to years prior to the
commencement of the bankruptcy case, they can be applied in the corresponding taxable year of the debtor. 10 These NOLs are applied
before any NOLs
21
arising from the administration of the bankruptcy estate. '
Prior law was also unclear concerning the deductibility of administration
and related expenses of the bankruptcy estate. Under I.R.C. § 1398(h)(1), the
bankruptcy estate, and only the estate,21 2 may deduct administrative expenses
allowable under Title 11 of the United States Code and any court fees or costs
assessed against the estate under Title 28 to the extent that they are not capital
expenditures or otherwise nondeductible. 1 3 Furthermore, the estate may
carry back for three years or forward for seven years any such expenses not
used in the current year, but only to a taxable year of the bankruptcy estate
and not that of the debtor.214
I.R.C. 1398(e)(3) provides that the determination of whether any amount
paid or incurred by the estate is allowable as a deduction shall be made as if
paid by the debtor and as if the debtor were still engaged in the trade or
business that the debtor has been engaged in before commencing the case. It
appears that the same accounting method used for income should be used for
deductions. Additionally, I.R.C. § 1398(e)(3) permits the estate to characterize some of its expenditures as trade or business expenses which can be used
to offset current income of the estate.

207. I.R.C. § 1398(e)(3) (1988).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. I.R.C. § 13980)(2) (1988).
211. I.R.C. § 1398(h)(2)(C) (1988).
212. I.R.C. § 1398(h)(2)(D) (1988).
213. Expenses that would otherwise be nondeductible include those under 26 U.S.C.A. § 265
(West Supp. 1995).
214. I.R.C. § 1398(h)(2) (1988).
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C. Short-Year Election
I.R.C. § 1398(d)(1) provides that as a general rule, the taxable year of an
individual debtor should be determined without regard to the bankruptcy case.
Nonetheless, an individual debtor is entitled to one irrevocable election to
close his or her taxable year. Thus, § 1398(d)(2) creates an election that a
debtor may make to split his or her taxable year into two shorter taxable years.
If the election to have two short taxable years is made, the debtor is required
to annualize his or her taxable income for each short taxable year in the same
manner as if a change of annual accounting period has been made.215
The § 1398(d)(2) election is an important prebankruptcy planning tool that
is often overlooked. The first short taxable year begins on the first day of the
debtor's normal tax year and ends on the day before the day the bankruptcy
case was commenced. The second taxable year begins on the commencement
date and ends at the end of the debtor's normal tax year. 216 Thus, if a
bankruptcy case were commenced on July 15, a calendar-year debtor may elect
to file a short period return for January 1 through July 14 and a second short
period return for the balance of the calendar year (July 15 through December
31). As a result of such an election, the debtor's tax liability for the first short
taxable year becomes an allowable claim against the bankruptcy estate. If the
election is not made, the taxable year of the debtor is determined without
regard to the bankruptcy case, and the taxes for the current tax year are not
an allowable claim against the estate.2" 7
The election is not available to a debtor who has no assets other than
property which may be treated as exempt property under 11 U.S.C. § 522.218 The election is denied in this instance because there are no assets in the
bankruptcy estate out of which the debtor's tax liability for the period prior to
the commencement date could be collected.
A nondebtor spouse may timely join in the § 1398(d)(2) election.
Generally, all assets of a married couple filing a joint petition will become
property of a single estate, including separate and community property of each
spouse. 219 This, however, is not always the case. A court has the authority
to determine to what extent the estates should be consolidated.? 0 When are
the estates not consolidated? Generally, in cases in which the spouses have
separate creditors and significant separate property, a bankruptcy court might
decide not to consolidate the estates."

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(F) (1988).
I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(A) (1988).
I.R.C. § 1398(d)(1) (1988).
I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(C) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1), (e)(2) (1988).
11 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
Note that the right to file joint returns under I.R.C. § 6013 is limited to a husband and
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In the case of a married debtor who files a joint return with his or her
spouse, the spouse may join in the debtor's election of two short taxable
years. t
The parties are required to file a joint return for the first short
taxable year. However, the parties need not file a joint return for the second
short taxable year. If, subsequent to joining in the debtor's election, a
separate bankruptcy case is commenced by or against the debtor's spouse, the
spouse is not precluded from making a separate election for two short taxable
years.'
The original debtor would then be able to join in the election made
by the spouse to have two short taxable years if the debtor's spouse has joined
in the debtor's election or if no election was made by the debtor. Conceivably, the debtor and spouse could have three short taxable years.
The irrevocable election regarding the taxable year must be made on or
before the fifteenth day of the fourth month following the close of the first
short taxable year, that is, the day before the commencement date.224 For
example, if a bankruptcy case is commenced on March 1, the debtor must file
his or her election on or before June 15. This is the same amount of time an
individual taxpayer normally has to file a tax return after the close of the
taxable year.'
The short-year election must be made by the debtor on or before the date
for filing his or her return for the short-taxable year. I.R.C. § 6072 requires
that returns be made on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth month
following the close of a fiscal year. A Treasury Regulation further provides
that the short-term return be filed on or before the fifteenth day of the fourth
full month following the close of the taxable year. 6 Again, the election
must be made on the return. Once made, the election is irrevocable.

wife. Since their bankruptcy estates are separate entities from the individuals, the privilege to file
joint returns has not been extended to the bankruptcy estates. Accordingly, separate returns must
be filed for each estate. For example, assume a husband and wife have both filed for bankruptcy,
and they have filed joint returns both before and during the bankruptcy case. Separate returns
must be filed for each estate, and the losses of one estate cannot be offset against the income of
the other estate.
222. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(B) (1988).
223. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-14T (f) (redesignated in 1992).
224. I.R.C. § 1398(d)(2)(D), 6072(a) (1988).
225. Under temporary regulations, the election can be made by filing the return for the first
short period on or before the due date or by submitting a statement of election attached to an
application for extension of time for filing the first short period return on or before such date.
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-14T(d) (redesignated in 1992). To facilitate processing, the
taxpayer should write "Section 1398 Election" at the top of the tax return. For further guidance
regarding the short-year election, see MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 185, §§ 18.16-.22.
226. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-14T(d) (as redesignated in 1992). For a discussion
regarding whether an individual debtor may obtain an extension of time by which to make the
election, see MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 185, § 18.19.
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When an involuntary petition is filed, one court has held that for purposes
of the LR.C. § 1398 election, the commencement date is the date of the entry
for the order of relief. 7 This case is clearly wrong. Section 1398(d)(3)
provides that for purpose of § 1398(d)(2), a case is commenced on the date the
individual case begins.
In Kreidle the court concluded that the debtors timely elected to terminate
their taxable year pursuant to § 1398(d)(2). 22' Creditors commenced an
involuntary case against the debtors on June 20, 1986. The order for relief,
however, was entered on October 2, 1986. The debtors made their election
on January 15, 1986.11 The January 15 election would be timely if the
four-month period began to run from the order for relief but would be
untimely if measured from the commencement of the case, that is, the filing
of the bankruptcy petition.Y0 The Kreidle court chose to tie the beginning
of the four month period to the entry of the order for relief. There are a
number of laudable reasons to do so: why prejudice a debtor's ability to elect
under § 1398(d)(2) when he or she might be focused on fighting an involuntary case? Nonetheless, § 1398 and the Bankruptcy Code are clear. Section
1398 provides that the "commencement date" is the measuring date." That
section further defines "commencement date" as "the day on which the case
under Title 11 of the United States Code to which this section applies
commences."2 32 Bankruptcy Code §§ 301 and 303 are equally clear.
Section 301 provides that a voluntary case is commenced by the filing of a
petition by an eligible debtor. That section further provides that the
commencement of a voluntary case constitutes an order for relief. 1 3 Section
303 provides that an "involuntary case against a person is commenced by the
filing with the bankruptcy court of a petition under chapter 7 or 11 of this
title . . .234
Under § 303(h) the order for relief is entered by the court at
some later date. Kreidle is wrong.
One final point in this section deals with the mechanics of the short-year
election under § 1398(d), under which an individual debtor must elect to
bifurcate his tax year to take advantage of the tax benefits in I.R.C. § 1398.
Failure to make the election in a timely manner results in a waiver of the
§ 1398 tax benefits.

227.
1992).
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

In re Kreidle, 146 B.R. 464, 470 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1991), aff'd, 143 B.R. 941 (D. Colo.
Id. at 470.
Id. at 466.
See 11 U.S.C. § 301 (1988); 11 U.S.C.A. § 303 (vest 1993 & Supp. 1995).
See I.R.C. § 1398(d)(3) (1988).
See id.

233. See 11 U.S.C. § 301.
234. 11 U.S.C.A. § 303(b) (West Supp. 1995) (emphasis added).
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Most individual debtors benefit from the § 1398(d)(2) short-year election.
Yet, many debtors fail to make a timely election because of miscalculations or
lack of advice from counsel. I.R.C. § 1398 should be modified to provide for
its automatic application absent an election opting out of § 1398(d)(2) shortyear treatment. This modification should reduce the failure to use the benefits
provided by I.R.C. § 1398, thus furthering the fresh start policy embodied in
both the Bankruptcy Code and Internal Revenue Code.
D. Consequences of the Election
The short-year election is one of the most potent pre-bankruptcy planning
tools because of its wide availability to individual debtors. The most
significant effect of the election is that any tax liability for the first short-year
becomes an allowable § 507(a)(8) priority claim against the estate. Thus, the
debtor may essentially force his or her unsecured creditors to pay all or a
portion of the first short-year tax claim. Of course, if there are insufficient
assets to pay the short-year tax claims in full, they do survive the bankruptcy
as a nondischargeable claim under § 523(a)(1) of the Code. If the debtor fails
to make the election, then any tax liability for the complete year is not an
allowable claim against the estate because it is a postpetition claim, and, is,
therefore, nondischargeable. Moreover, if a debtor makes the election, then
a debtor's tax attributes as of the end of the first taxable year are transferred
to the estate to be used by the estate to shelter income. Absent the election,
the estate will succeed to the attributes as they existed on December 31 of the
prior year (assuming a calendar year taxpayer). Finally, if the election is
made, the debtor is required to annualize his or her taxable income for each
short taxable year in the same manner as if a change of annual accounting
period has been made.
An example might help clarify the potent effect of a timely election. 5
Will Riker files a Chapter 11 petition on March 8, 1995. From January 1
through March 7, 1995, Will earned $25,000 as salary and capital gains of
$15,000. From March 8 through December 31, 1995, Will earned $75,000
as salary.
No election made: Will will file one return for the full 1995 tax year,
reflecting $100,000 in salary income and $15,000 in capital gains. Because
Will failed to make the election, no part of the tax claim attributable to his
1995 income is an allowable claim against Will's bankruptcy estate. Will,
continues, however, to owe the tax.

235. This example is borrowed from MCQUEEN & WILLIAMS, supra note 185, § 18.20.
Numerous example of the § 1398(d)(2) election may be found in sections 18.16 through 18.21
of the article.
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Election made: Will files two tax returns. The first return is for the first
short-tax year from January 1 through March 7, reflecting $25,000 in salary
and $15,000 in capital gains. The second return is for the second short-tax
year from March 8 through December 31, reflecting the salary of $75,000
earned postpetition. 3 6 By making the short-year election, Will converts the
tax claim arising out of the first short year into an allowable claim against the
estate. Moreover, this allowable claim is paid out as a § 507(a)(8) priority
claim under the Code. However, any portion of the claim not satisfied in
bankruptcy survives the discharge under § 523(a)(1)(A). Thus, the debtor is
liable for any deficiency in payment of the tax.
E. Termination of the Estate
Upon termination of the bankruptcy estate, any assets held in the estate
are transferred to the debtor. The transfer of the assets upon termination, if
not a sale or exchange, will not be treated as a disposition for purposes of
recognition of gain or loss, recapture of deductions or credits, or acceleration
of income or deductions. z 7 With respect to any transferred asset, the debtor
will receive the same basis, holding period, and character as the estate.
Hence, for certain nondepreciable assets, the debtor might be in the same tax
position as before the commencement of the bankruptcy case.
In addition to the return of assets to the debtor upon termination of the
bankruptcy case, a debtor succeeds to the categories of tax attributes of the
estate that were originally transferred to the estate by the debtor under
§ 1398(g).2 38 In the event a debtor succeeds to a net operating loss or
unused credit of the bankruptcy estate, such loss or credit must be used only
prospectively. Losses incurred by a bankruptcy estate may be carried back to
its prior years and applicable prebankruptcy years of the debtor but not against
postbankruptcy years of the debtor. Losses incurred by the debtor can be
applied against its postbankruptcy income but cannot be carried back to the

236. When is it advisable for a debtor to make the short-year election? There is no easy
answer to the questions posed. Whether a debtor should make the I.R.C. § 1398 election
depends on the particular facts and circumstances at hand. As a general rule, it appears that in
most cases the election should be made. By making the election, a debtor is able to shift at least
some of the tax liability to the estate as an allowable § 507(a)(8) priority claim. However, if the
claim is not satisfied it will be nondischargeable and survive the bankruptcy. There might be
circumstances present to dissuade a debtor from making the election when substantial net
operating losses are involved. For examples of when to and when not to make the election, see
McQueen and Williams, supra note _, at §§ 18.16-18.21.
237. I.R.C. § 1398(0(2) (1988).
238. I.R.C. § 1398(i) (1988); see also proposed regulations 26 C.F.R. § 1.1398-1 & -2, 57
Fed. Reg. 53300 (1992) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 110) (proposed Nov. 9, 1992).
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prebankruptcy years of the debtor nor applied against any taxable income of
the bankruptcy estate.Y39
There is no provision that permits the debtor to carry back any losses or
credits inherited from its bankruptcy estate to prior years of the debtor. For
example, if, in the last years of the bankruptcy, the estate incurred a net
operating loss of $10,000 which is transferred to the debtor, the loss cannot
be carried back to any prior years of the debtor. If, however, the estate is
terminated in the middle of the year, the debtor can apply the losses against
its income for that same year.
V. CONCLUSION
Individual debtor Chapter 11 cases present wonderfully complex and
challenging bankruptcy and tax issues. There is no reason to believe that the
recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Code24" that increase the debt ceiling
limits in Chapter 13 cases will alleviate the need for further discussion
regarding these issues.24 Although the individual debtor seeks as broad a
discharge as possible, by the nature of the beast, he or she also seeks to
reorganize, even if, ultimately, this means an orderly liquidation. This tension
is at the core of many of the issues posed by the individual debtor in Chapter
11. For example, a narrow reading of the postpetition earnings exclusion in
§ 541(a)(6) favors reorganization in the first instance even over the debtor's
right to a fresh start. In contrast, a broad reading gives priority to a debtor's
fresh start above the concerns of creditors about the reorganization.
So too with I.R.C. § 1398. Treating the estate as a separate taxable entity
furthers a debtor's fresh start by confining taxes owed by the estate to the
estate. Additionally, I.R.C. § 1398 provides a specific tax benefit to an
individual debtor who has filed for relief under Chapter 7 or 11. By making
the § 1398(d)(2) election, a debtor is able to convert what otherwise would be
a postpetition tax claim into a prepetition § 507(a)(8) priority claim that may
be satisfied with estate assets. Nonetheless, § 1398 extracts a price for its
benefits. The price a debtor must pay is the transfer to the estate of the
enumerated tax attributes in I.R.C. § 1398(g), 42 and any remaining tax

239. I.R.C. § 13980)(2)(B) (1988).
240. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106-4150 (1994).
241. For debtors willing to pay the increased cost of administration, Chapter 11 may be a more
attractive alternative to Chapter 13 because of the greater autonomy in the former type of cases.
No one quite knows what role the Chapter 13 standing trustee will play in the expanded use of
Chapter 13 by sole proprietorships.
242. Often, this cost is illusory. With proper prebankruptcy training, most, if not all, of the
tax attributes listed in I.R.C. § 1398(g) will already have been used up by the debtor before the
bankruptcy petition is filed.
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claim after the § 1398(d)(2) election has been made is nondischargeable under
§ 523(a)(1).
The drafters of I.R.C. § 1398 and the Bankruptcy Code recognized an
obvious fact that was not quite as obvious as one might initially think. The
drafters recognized that all is not clear and certain in an organic bankruptcy
system. Bankruptcy, tax, and bankruptcy taxation are complex systems
because economic life is complex. For these systems to maintain a pragmatic
and philosophical rhythm, they must be organic; they must grow and adapt.
Growth in the law is not a painless process. Conflict is reality. There are
those who will look at the conflict inherent in bankruptcy and tax and see the
debtor's discharge and nothing else. Then there are those who will look at the
conflict and see a thief at some level of abstraction shirking his or her
responsibility to creditors and government. In § 1398, the drafters envisioned
a bankruptcy world somewhere between the two termini, a bankruptcy world
of vagueness and not exactitude.
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